Monday, August 4, 2008

Individuals: An essay in Descriptive Metaphysics


Synopsis 
Since its publication in 1959, Individuals has become a modern philosophical classic. Bold in scope and ambition, it continues to influence debates in metaphysics, philosophy of logic and language, and epistemology. Peter Strawson's most famous work, it sets out to describe nothing less than the basic subject matter of our thought. It contains Strawson's now famous argument for descriptive metaphysics and his repudiation of revisionary metaphysics, in which reality is something beyond the world of appearances. The first part of the book sets out the place of bodies and persons in our thought. Strawson poses some fundamental questions, such as why we ascribe states of consciousness to anything, and why we ascribe them to the same thing to which we ascribe physical predicates.The second part of the book establishes the connection between bodies and persons and the idea of an object of reference. Strawson argues that the crucial link between these two notions, and with it, the explanation of the status of the particular as the paradigm logical subject, is found in the idea of 'completeness'. 

Throughout, Individuals advances some highly influential and controversial ideas, such as 'non-solipsistic consciousness' and the concept of a person a 'primitive concept'. 

Table of contents 
INTRODUCTION 9 
PART I: PARTICULARS 
1. BODIES 15 
1. The Identification of Particulars 15 
[1] We identify particulars in speech. The identifiability of some kinds of particular may be dependent upon the identifiability of other kinds. 15 
[2] Identification of particulars which are sensibly present. The identification of particulars which are not sensibly present raises a theoretical problem. Its solution. 17 
[3] The general conditions of particular-identification. These conditions are satisfiable because our knowledge of particulars forms a unified structure of a spatio-temporal character. 23 
2. Reidentification 31 
[4] A condition of our possessing such a scheme of knowledge of particulars is the ability to reidentify particulars. Scepticism about reidentification. 31 
[5] Reidentification of places. 36 
3. Basic Particulars 38 
[6] A general argument to show that material bodies are the basic particulars from the point of view of identification. 38 
[7] Arguments to the same effect from the nature of different categories of particulars. 40 
2. SOUNDS 59 
[1] Is the status of material bodies as basic particulars a necessary condition of any scheme whatever which provides for knowledge of objective particulars? 59 
[2] The character of this chapter. 63 
[3] The mode of the auditory world. The problem of satisfying the conditions of a non-solipsistic consciousness. 64 
3. PERSONS 87 
[1] Why are states of consciousness ascribed to anything? and why to the same thing as corporeal characteristics? 87 
[2] The unique position of the personal body in perceptual experience described; but this does not answer these questions. 90 
[3] Cartesian and 'No-ownership' views. The incoherence of the No-ownership view. 94 
[4] A condition of the ascription of states of consciousness to oneself is ability to ascribe them to others. The incoherence of the Cartesian view. The primitiveness of the concept of a person. 98 
[5] The logical character of a fundamental class of personal predicates. 103 
[6] The central importance of predicates ascribing actions. The idea of a 'group mind'. 110 
[7] Disembodiment. 115 
4. MONADS 117 
PART II: LOGICAL SUBJECTS 
5. SUBJECT AND PREDICATE (1): TWO CRITERIA 137 
[1] The Distinction between particulars and universals is traditionally associated in a certain way with the distinction between reference and predication or between subject and predicate. 137 
1. The 'Grammatical' Criterion 139 
[2] Various forms of the reference-predication or subjectpredicate distinction recognized by philosophers. 139 
[3] One prima facie attractive way of explaining the distinction is shown to be inadequate. Viewing it as a distinction between grammatical styles of term-introduction seems to yield more satisfactory results. 142 
[4] Quine's distinction in terms of the variables of quantification does not at first sight offer an alternative interpretation. 153 
[5] Final statement, on the present approach, of the conditions of an expression's being a subject- or predicate-expression. 158 
[6] The present, grammatical approach to the subject-predicate distinction, though it appears to harmonize with authoritative views, is not the only possible approach. 160 
[7] The grammatical approach encourages scepticism both about the importance of the subject-predicate distinction and about its traditional association with the particular-universal distinction. 162 
2. The Category Criterion 167 
[8] Characterizing, instantial and attributive ties: or different ways in which particular and universal terms may collect each other in assertions. 167 
[9] A new criterion for subjects and predicates, based on the differences between particulars and universals as principles of collection of terms in assertions. The new criterion guarantees the traditional association between the two distinctions. 171 
3. Tensions and Affinities between these Criteria 173 
[10] How the grammatical appearance of predicating a particular is avoided in certain cases of the assertion of a characterizing tie. 173 
[11] How the grammatical appearance of predicating a particular is avoided in certain cases of the assertion of an attributive tie. 176 
6. SUBJECT AND PREDICATE (2): LOGICAL SUBJECTS AND PARTICULAR OBJECTS 180 
1. The Introduction of Particulars into Propositions 180 
[1] The introduction of a particular into a proposition requires knowledge of an empirical fact: the introduction of a universal does not. 180 
[2] Affinity between the grammatical and categorial criteria for subject- and predicate-expressions in part explained by a mediating distinction between 'completeness' and 'incompleteness'. Once the fundamental association between the subject-predicate and particular-universal distinctions is established, further extensions of the former distinction may be explained by analogy etc. 186 
[3] Further explanations of the idea of 'completeness': the the presuppositions of expressions introducing particular terms. 190 
[4] Consideration and rejection of a simplified form of the above theory. 194 
2. The Introduction of Particulars into Discourse 198 
[5] Can the above account of the conditions of introducing particulars into propositions be supplemented with an account of the conditions of introducing particulars into discourse? The conditions of success in any such attempt. 198 
[6] Feature-concepts and sortal universals: the introduction of basic particulars involves the adoption of criteria of reidentification. 202 
[7] The logical complexity of particulars and the 'completeness' of logical subject-expressions. Particulars the paradigm logical subjects. 210 
7. LANGUAGE WITHOUT PARTICULARS 214 
[1] In a feature-placing language the subject-predicate distinction has no place. 214 
[2] Problems involved in dispensing with ordinary particulars 217 
[3] Places, times and place-times as logical subjects. 221 
8. LOGICAL SUBJECTS AND EXISTENCE 226 
[1] The grammatical index of appearance in a proposition as an individual or logical subject. Existential propositions. 226 
[2] Nominalism. Why reductionist pressure on non-particular individuals varies in strength for different types of non-particular. 230 
[3] The nature and form of the nominalist drive. Quantification and existence. 234 
[4] 'Existence and quantification. 239 
[5] Statements of identity. Plural subject-expressions. Reference, predication and propositions. 242 
CONCLUSION 246 
INDEX 251 
I: ROMANTICISM AND RESISTANCE 
Mary Favret 

He died, and the world showed no outward sign. . . . He died, and his place . . . has never been filled up. Mary Shelley, Preface to The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley Any objective method, duly verified, belies the initial contact with the object. It must first scrutinize everything... 

II: CULTURE AND CRITICISM 
Laurie Langbauer 

Writing in the first issue of Cultural Studies , the Australian critic Jennifer Craik cites Stuart Hall and Tony Bennett to argue that "the development of cultural studies has seen an uneasy alliance. . . which overlooks the intrinsic incommensurability... 



255 Pages 
# Methuen (1964) 
# Language: English 
# ASIN: B000BN2VDK


http://rapidshare.com/files/94626067/An_Essay_in_Descriptive_Metaphysics.pdf




free books, free ebooks , latest free books , download free books , download free ebooks , free medical ebooks , free engineering ebooks, free science ebooks , free mathematics ebooks , free history ebooks , fee psychology ebooks , free computer ebooks , free law ebooks

0 comments: